YOUTH, VIOLENCE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN RIO DE JANEIRO

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Violence in a human health perspective

- Violence, unlike diseases, provokes suffering without the interference of a vector or hereditary factors. It is totally human.
- Its instruments, guns or physical force, is made, sold and used by human beings on other human beings.
- It is entirely relational or interactional. It is the result of an interaction in which the stronger has no sympathy, empathy or compassion towards the victim's suffering.
- But what makes human beings act in this way?
Social determinants of victimization by violence

- Personal variables: income, schooling, gender, age. Macro-social quantitative data. Historical cultural perspective: social selves or subjective formations.
- Domicile or family variables: type, number of members, number of rooms, bathrooms per person etc. are other measures of inequality. Qualitative data of family dynamics (cohesion and conflicts).
- Community or neighbourhood variables: persons or families are part of societies. Ecological approach: ethnic heterogeneity, and population instability. New terms: social cohesion, trust, sociability, social capital, collective efficacy. how do we measure them? Social indicators never sufficient. Institutional and political historical contexts are necessary.
Organized Crime threatens the organization, governance and the monopoly of legitimate violence.

More threats where institutional governance is weak and inconsistent: corruption, irreverence towards law, inefficiency in the justice system, inadequate public policies for prevention and treatment.

Increased violence creates insecurity and further burden the costs of the health and security systems. Less money for other important policies in the fight against poverty, such as education.
Political institutional context in Brazil: Contradictions of democratization

- The process of re-democratization in 1978 was accompanied by a spectacular increase of violent crime, particularly homicide among young men.
- A nation built by the ideals of cordiality and conciliation, with tolerance of racial, ethnic and religious, strengthened the mechanisms of personal revenge and uncontrollable aggression.
- In the re-democratization process, neither forgiveness nor peace between opposed groups discussed publicly at the end of the military government.
- Re-democratization remains incomplete or split. Not many changes in the Military Police to control excessive use of force, or access to guns exclusive to Brazilian Armed Forces. Repressive disruption of popular organizations. Effects on neighbourhoods?
Repression against prohibited drugs stimulates crime

- Prohibited economic activity, crime not consensually defined, brings new actors interested in maintaining the status quo because of the advantages they get.
- The illusion of the "easy money" attracts poor young people for criminal gangs but enriches other characters unpunished and rich: recipients of stolen goods, wholesale traffickers, smugglers of guns, corrupt policemen, the paramilitary.
- Civil and Military Police make incursions in slums and poor neighborhoods. But corrupt policemen supply the weapons to the arsenal of traffickers inside favelas and are not investigated.
- Poor and black youth who have been arrested as traffickers increase prison population, making the criminal justice system in the country unjust, rising revolt and the option for deviant behavior.
Money, weapons and men in drug traffic: ecology of danger

- Possession of firearms explained by the logic of war: competitors become mortal enemies that need to be discouraged by a progressive increase of guns and men.
- This logic contaminate youths. Peer groups are the biggest predictor of delinquency among young men, particularly homicide by gun.
- Youths use guns to avoid being victimized by their armed peers, to gain respect and to enjoy the prestige associated with possession of guns.
- Large quantity of guns available to youths in very crowded areas, brought by corrupt policemen and gun traffickers. Ideas and postures of cruelty and insensitivity towards others’ suffering expand.
Money, weapons and men in drug traffic: hyper masculinity

- Many styles of masculinity among migrants from other states, among young people of the second generation, among young whites, blacks and mulattos from Rio.
- In hyper masculinity, conspicuous consume defines the new successful masculine identities. Helping friends, neighbors and relatives, impressing everyone with a display of jewelry and expensive clothes on one’s body, giving parties and beverages in public places.
- Exacerbated masculinity style or the spectacular display of male protest: context of a localized but endless armed conflict, and a lot of money in your pocket. Youths become a threat to their neighborhoods.
Sources of data in Brazil

- **Ethnographic field work:** I did for the past 28 years in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Micro-social data for identification projects, gender ethos or subjective formations, the plurality of social selves, conflicts and sociability in neighbourhoods, including vicinal associations.

- **Official statistical data on crimes, especially homicide:** Police source (SESNAP/MJ), Health System source (DATASUS/MS)

- **Victimization surveys at NUPEVI/ IMS/ UERJ:** in 2006 – the city of Rio de Janeiro (3435 people); in 2007 – only in the favelas (660 people).
Coefficient of mortality by homicides (/100,000) – Brazil, 1991 – 2000

Coefficient of mortality by guns (/100.000) according to sex. Brazil, 1991 - 2000

Source: Sistema de Informação sobre Mortalidade (SIM) / Ministério da Saúde, Brasil.
Relative male risk of death by guns in 10 Brazilian capital cities, 2000.

Source: Sistema de Informação sobre Mortalidade (SIM)/ Ministério da Saúde, Brasil.
The richest, the most violent region of Brazil: the Southeast homicide rates in 4 Capital cities

Youth homicide rates in capital cities of Southeast Brazil

Fonte: DATASUS, Ministério da Saúde, Governo Federal
Main forms of victimization in the city: relatives, friends and neighbours murdered

- 5.4% of people with 15 years-old and more had relatives murdered; 5.8% lost friends; 4.7% lost neighbours in the last 12 months.
- The distribution of losses among 15 year-old people and more in Rio de Janeiro is not homogeneous.
- Proportion of neighbours murdered more correlated with the housing area.
- Proportion of friends murdered more correlated with age.
- Proportion of relatives murdered more correlated with family income.
Greater percentages of people with small family income that had relatives murdered in the previous 12 months.

Percentage of residents 15 or more years old who had relatives killed, according to family income:

- Till 02 SM: 7.5%
- 02 to 04 SM: 5.6%
- 04 to 07 SM: 5.0%
- 07 to 11 SM: 4.4%
- More than 11 SM: 4.0%

Fonte: Pesquisa Vitimização NUPEVI 2005-2006 município Rio de Janeiro
Younger people have percentages ten to six times larger than older ones.

Percentages of residents 15 or more years old who had friends killed, according to categories of age:

- 15-19: 9,4%
- 20-29: 9,1%
- 30-39: 7,7%
- 40-49: 6,2%
- 50-59: 4,6%
- 60-69: 2,1%
- 70+: 0,8%

Fonte: Pesquisa Vitimização NUPEVI 2005-2006 município Rio de Janeiro
Percentages of people that had neighbours killed: 0% in AP4, 0,5% in AP 2.1, 12 times greater in AP2.2, AP3.1, AP3.2, AP5.2 and AP5.3 (areas with favelas controlled by traffickers or militias)
The paradox of Rio de Janeiro: percentages of sociable dealings (chats, kindness and trust) between neighbours greater in AP1 and AP3 also the most violent.
Forms of private security

- lack of policing, police corruption and violence led to an “endless war”, as neighbours call it, which puts those who live in poor areas between two opposing armed conflicts: the war between bandits of different “commandos”; the war between policemen and bandits, not always to repress crime and to abide to the law.

- 25% of the people interviewed admitted having some kind of private security.

- Variations: paid or unpaid traffickers, paid or unpaid neighbors; informal vigilantes; security enterprise employees in uniform; employees without uniforms; militia or extermination groups
Noise of gun firing and crimes heard or seen in the city

- firing is more heard than seen the noise (and the fear it produces) is not evenly distributed between neighbourhoods, even the poor ones. The richest planning areas (AP 2.1 and 4) are the ones where firing is much less heard. Some of the poorest (AP 1, 3 and 5.2), where trafficking gangs dominate most of the favelas, are the ones with most of the firing. AP 5.1, where many military personnel live, and 5.3, where paramilitary groups controls the territory instead of trafficking gangs, present the lower proportions of firing as well.
Favelas controlled by traffickers or militias: gun firing heard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of sound</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Militia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fonte: Pesquisa Vitimização NUPEVI 2007 favelas do Rio de Janeiro
Excessive force used by PMs five times greater in favelas

Percent of interviewees, residents and non-residents in favelas who saw police firing without provocation in their neighborhood (last 12 months)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Favelas</th>
<th>Não Favelas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentual</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excessive force used by PMs five times greater in favelas
Excessive force used by PMs - firing without provocation in their neighbourhoods (by Area of Planning last 12 months)

Percentuais dos moradores do Município do Rio de Janeiro que viram policiais atirando em suas vizinhanças, por Áreas de Planejamento

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Planning</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ap1</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap2.1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap2.2</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap3.1</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap3.2</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap3.3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap4.1</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap5.1</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap5.2</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap5.3</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Crimes heard or seen in the neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saw or heard in your neighbourhood</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Favelas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People beating up other people</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People consuming illegal drugs in the street</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People selling illegal drugs in the street</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People fighting with guns</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw people being mugged in the street</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw neighbours being taken away by force</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw people killed by guns in the neighbourhood</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw Policemen extorting or intimidating people</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw Policemen's firing towards people without provocation</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assaults more common in favelas controlled by militias

Percentuais de homens e mulheres agredidos na vida toda em favelas dominadas por traficantes ou por milícias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Homens</th>
<th>Mulheres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favelas dominadas por traficantes</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>12,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favelas com milícia</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>12,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since violent deaths account nowadays for 85% of premature deaths between 15 and 30 years old, one can say that the probability of dying young due to violence, especially homicides, in some favelas is several times bigger than in richer districts. The formula $15q_{15}$ per one thousand is the probability of dying before 30 years old for those youngsters who are 15 years old. Comparing several districts and favelas that are administrative districts of the city, one gets the following picture:
As diferenças no risco de morrer jovem entre as RAs do Rio de Janeiro são significativas: na Lagoa, bairro de alta renda familiar, de 100.000 nascidos vivos, 97.535 completam 15 anos de idade e 96.895 chegam aos 30 anos; no Complexo do Alemão, um complexo de favelas com renda familiar baixa e um dos piores IDH do Rio de Janeiro, para 100.000 nascidos vivos apenas 89.825 completam 15 anos e 87.083 completam 30 anos.
Risk of dying young and per capita income do not coincide in favelas

- Favelas with similar per capita income do not present the same risk: whereas in the Complex of Alemão (AP3) the probability of dying between 15 and 30 years old is over 2500, in Jacarezinho, Maré and Rocinha it is below 2000, and in Cidade de Deus, with the same income level it is around 1200.

- Zona Portuária (AP1), where there are many favelas but income is greater, also shows a high probability of dying prematurely: almost 2000. Rio Comprido (AP1) with an income 2 times bigger, the risk is almost equal to this one.

- Santa Tereza (AP1), with a 3 times bigger income but many favelas controlled by traffickers, the risk of dying young is the same of Cidade de Deus: 1200.
Probability of dying before 30 years old amongst 1000 15 years old youngsters (15q15 per 1,000), by Administrative Regions of Rio de Janeiro
Coefficients of death by aggressions higher for blacks and browns in Rio de Janeiro

Taxa de homicídio de homens entre 15 e 39 anos por Raça/Cor em 2005 no Rio de Janeiro

Branca; 86,7  
Preta; 282,9  
Parda; 266,5

Fonte: DATASUS, Ministério da Saúde, Governo Federal
CME by Homicides and Legal Interventions of white men, by Planning Area, 15 to 39 years old population

CME Brancos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Areas</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP 2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AP 2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP 3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AP 3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP 3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AP 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP 5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP 5.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP 5.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CME by Homicides and Legal Interventions of brown men, by Planning Area, 15 to 39 years old population
CME by Homicides and Legal Interventions of black men, by Planning Area, 15 to 39 years old population
Dividindo em apenas dois níveis de risco: mais alto e mais baixo:
Legenda

- Homicídios em 2005
- Av. Brasil
- Favelas em 2000

Kernel de homicídios

- 0 - 0,0000000414
- 0,0000000414 - 0,0000000020
- 0,0000000120 - 0,00000010242
- 0,0000010242 - 0,000000013657
- 0,000000013657 - 0,000017071
- 0,000017071 - 0,000020495
- 0,000020495 - 0,000023899
- 0,000023899 - 0,000027313
- 0,000027313 - 0,000030727

Fonte de dados: SIM/DATASUS e IBGE
Digitização dos mapas: Laboratório de Geoprocessamento/DISI/CICT/C/FCruz
Estufuração dos mapas: NUPEVILEA/DID
The three criminal factions that control favelas in Rio de Janeiro
Areas controlled by militias in Rio de Janeiro
Prevention of violence: stop the flux of guns to youths

- Restrain the current of guns for the most dangerous and insecure places and areas means to investigate more the gun and drug suppliers networks.
- Youths learn to use guns and be cruel with other youths who received military training in the Brazilian Armed forces. Reverse this.
- Policing should be gun oriented in order to apprehend guns and stop the training for using them. Disarm youths of the instrument and postures of death.
Prevention of violence: culture of civility

- Educate for civility everywhere: pride of being a man because of respect for others and not for the disposition to kill rivals. Dissolving desire to kill inside their hearts and minds.
- Sport and culture projects in the neighborhoods must be collective and inter-generational. Mobilize neighbors of different ages, mainly the elderly. Strategy for social policy must be integrated and continuing. Never many small, discontinuous and fragmented interventions.
- Of course, good schools and professional training to create real alternatives of employment or autonomous work.